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REGULATING POLICE CHOKEHOLDS
TREVOR GEORGE GARDNER & ESAM AL-SHAREFFI*
This Article presents findings from an analysis of police chokehold
policies enacted at the federal, state, and municipal levels of government. In
addition to identifying the jurisdictions that restricted police chokeholds in
the wake of George Floyd’s death on May 25, 2020, the Article conveys (via
analysis of an original dataset) the considerable variance in the quality of
police chokehold regulation. While many jurisdictions regulate the police
chokehold, the strength of such regulations should not be taken for granted.
Police chokehold policies vary by the type of chokehold barred (“air choke”
and/or carotid choke), the degree of the chokehold restriction, an officer’s
“duty to intervene” when observing improper police application of the
chokehold, and the type of sanction attached to a chokehold policy violation
(criminal and/or administrative). Following the presentation of chokehold
policy variance, the authors recommend an absolute bar of both air chokes
and carotid chokes. However, in contemplating such a policy, policymakers
should consider whether an officer authorized to use deadly force but barred
from applying the air or carotid choke will be inclined to use his firearm as
a force alternative.
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of May 25, 2020, George Floyd bought a pack of
cigarettes from Cup Foods, a grocery store in Minneapolis, Minnesota.1
Cup’s owner would later describe Mr. Floyd as a “regular”—a pleasant
customer with a friendly face.2
The owner was not working at the store on the evening of Floyd’s death.
A teenage employee standing in for the owner took Floyd’s money but
suspected that Floyd had passed a $20 counterfeit bill.3 The employee called
911.4
When officers arrived at the store, they found Floyd sitting with two
other people in a parked car.5 The officers removed Floyd from the vehicle
and handcuffed him.6 Minutes later, with Officer Derek Chauvin’s left knee
planted between Floyd’s head and neck, Floyd stated repeatedly, “I can’t
breathe.”7 He would eventually call out for his mother (“Mom, I love you”),
his children (“Tell my kids I love them”), and accurately predict his grim fate
(“I’m dead”).8

1

George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, BBC (July 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726 [https://perma.cc/Q82M-NRZL].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Soo Kim, Why Was George Floyd Arrested? Police Release 911 Call That Led to His
Death, NEWSWEEK (May 29, 2020, 7:50 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/george-floyd-911transcript-1507317 [https://perma.cc/FWK3-PZLG].
5 George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. Bystanders urgently asked the restraining officers to check Floyd’s pulse. One of the
officers complied, later saying that he “couldn’t find one.” It was only then that Officer
Chauvin removed his knee from a motionless Mr. Floyd. Floyd was taken by ambulance to
Hennepin County Medical Center where he was pronounced dead approximately one hour
later. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for
the Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014, at A1.
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Only six years earlier, Eric Garner said, “I can’t breathe” eleven times
in the moments after an NYPD police officer attempted to subdue Garner by
wrapping his arms around Garner’s torso and neck.9 The medical examiner
ruled that Garner died from the physical pressure applied by police,
“compression of the neck (choke hold), compression of the chest and prone
positioning during physical restraint.”10 In the year following Garner’s death,
only a handful of jurisdictions moved to regulate the police chokehold11
despite a broadly circulated video of police applying the neck restraint and
Garner subsequently dying from cardiac arrest.12
The forthcoming longitudinal analysis of police chokehold policy data
demonstrates that the national public responded differently to Mr. Floyd’s
death than to Mr. Garner’s. In the summer of 2020, thirty-three jurisdictions
banned or restricted police use of the chokehold maneuver.13 This Article

9 Wesley Lowery, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Five Years After Eric Garner Died in Struggle with
New York Police, Resolution Still Elusive, WASH. POST (June 13, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/i-cant-breathe-five-years-after-eric-garner-diedin-struggle-with-new-york-police-resolution-still-elusive/2019/06/13/23d7fad8-78f5-11e9bd25-c989555e7766_story.html [https://perma.cc/JWP3-P8K8].
10 Joesph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Dies from Chokehold During
Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/
nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html [https://perma
.cc/C8FH-M2L7].
11 See, e.g., DET. POLICE DEP’T, DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL: USE OF FORCE §
3.04.2-4.3 (2014) (revising the existing policy on August 6, 2014, and banning all neck
restraints, except where deadly force is authorized); CONSOL. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, OFF. OF
THE SHERIFF, GENERAL ORDER LXXII.6 (72) § VII (2014) (taking effect on October 30, 2014,
and banning the use of the “Tactical Neck Restraint”).
12 Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to
Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/
nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/XM8C-PP9F]. In
the 1980s, Daryl Gates, then Los Angeles chief of police, characterized the chokehold as an
act of compassion given the alternative forms of force available to police. William Raspberry,
The Chief and the Chokehold, WASH. POST, May 17, 1982, at A17. Gates also called for
investigation as to whether African Americans were uniquely vulnerable to injury from
chokeholds: “We may be finding that in some blacks when it (the choke hold) is applied, the
veins and arteries do not open as fast as they do in normal people.” Id. After being subject to
extensive criticism, Gates apologized, explaining that his “reference to ‘normal people’ was
unfortunate—very unfortunate—and was meant only to apply to the normal functioning of
blood traveling through arteries to the brain.” Id.
13 The project’s underlying dataset includes nearly all enacted state chokehold policies as
well as all enacted municipal policies for the fifty largest municipal jurisdictions with publicly
available use-of-force policies. ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA D. COOPER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
OFFENSES KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT IN LARGE CITIES, 2018 (2020). Of a total of sixty
enacted policies identified, thirty-two were enacted after Mr. Floyd’s death on May 25, 2020.
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details the quality and arc of this policy trend. To our knowledge, it is one of
the few national surveys of its kind.
This Article consists of five parts. Part I provides a detailed description
of the chokehold, drawing a distinction recognized in police department
policy manuals and statutory law between “air chokes” (intended to stem the
flow of oxygen to the lungs) and carotid or “blood” chokes (intended to stem
the flow of blood to the brain in order to quickly render the subject
unconscious).14 The difference between the two chokeholds is critical to
understanding the quality of the chokehold restrictions enacted in the wake
of Mr. Floyd’s death.15
Part II reviews federal consideration of police chokehold policy in the
summer of 2020.16 It begins with the Trump administration’s executive order
14 See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Chokeholds: The Difference Between Sleeper and Airway
Holds, NPR (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/12/04/368408203/chokeholds-thedifference-between-sleeper-holds-and-airway-holds [https://perma.cc/8TXY-9YME] (describing the differences between “chokehold” and “vascular hold”); Lyndsay Winkley, San
Diego Police Leaders Defend Use of Controversial Neck Restraint, Despite Continuing Calls
for a Ban, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 20, 2019), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
news/public-safety/story/2019-05-19/san-diego-police-leaders-defend-use-controversialneck-restraint-despite-calls-for-ban [https://perma.cc/WAQ2-U4V2] (demonstrating an
illustration by Michelle Guerrero showing the difference between chokeholds and carotid
restraints). Police use of the air and carotid chokeholds should not be confused with the “prone
restraint” where the officer leaves the suspect lying on his stomach after applying handcuffs.
Brief for Professor Seth Stoughton as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5,
Timpa v. City of Dallas, No. 20-10876 (5th Cir. Jan. 15, 2021). The prone restraint poses a
similar risk of asphyxiation given that a person subject to a prone restraint must lift his or her
bodyweight breathe because the position compresses the abdomen. Id.
15 Dataset on file with authors. Dataset variables include level of government (federal,
state, or local), type of sanction (criminal/administrative), date enacted, degree of restriction,
type of chokehold restricted (air/blood), and the duty to intervene.
16 In our accounting of federal chokehold policies, we searched for all Congressional
legislation and executive orders that sought to regulate police chokeholds or neck restraints.
The state-level inquiry encompassed all state-level legislation or gubernatorial executive
orders that sought to regulate the police chokehold or neck restraint. The municipal chokehold
policy dataset includes chokehold restrictions introduced by police departments as either
administrative policies and/or restrictions based in municipal orders for the fifty most
populous municipal jurisdictions. A table published by THE WASHINGTON POST was helpful in
this effort. Kimberly Kindy, Kevin Schaul & Ted Mellnik, Half of the Nation’s Largest Police
Departments Have Banned or Limited Neck Restraints Since June, WASH. POST (July 16,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/police-use-of-force-choke
hold-carotid-ban/ [https://perma.cc/R2L9-BRAM]. Search tools included LexisNexis;
Westlaw; Responses for Policing—State Bill Tracking Database, NCSL (Nov. 11, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/legislative-responses-for-policing
.aspx [https://perma.cc/HKS8-YV64]; the aforementioned WASHINGTON POST article, and
derivative searches via Google.com.
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conditioning federal funding for state and municipal security administration
on police chokehold regulation. It proceeds to a review of similar legislation
proposed in Congress.
Parts III and IV outline state and municipal government policy activity
as it pertains to the absolute or partial bar of police chokeholds as well as the
type of chokehold regulated, the presence or absence of criminal sanction
specific to the chokehold, and whether the policy requires an officer
witnessing a police chokehold violation to intervene to stop the transgression.
Part V offers a series of policy recommendations. It proposes, first, that
all states pass legislation restricting police use of chokeholds and, second,
that this legislation designate police application of the chokehold as deadly
force. It then recommends that the chokehold be excluded from the force
options available to police under agency policy. Finally, this Part advises that
governments refrain from enacting new criminal sanctions regarding the
chokehold. In our view, the statutory frameworks that govern unlawful police
violence are sufficient for prosecutorial purposes.17 The creation of new
superfluous choke-specific assault statutes and ordinances would ultimately
work against ongoing efforts to narrow the scope of the criminal code in
adherence to the philosophy of criminal law minimalism.18
I. AIR CHOKES AND CAROTID (BLOOD) CHOKES
Police chokehold policy is based, at least in part, on the intricate
physiology associated with the chokehold maneuver. The term air choke
characterizes the intentional application of pressure to the neck and throat to
prevent a subject from breathing.19 Alternatively, the carotid or “blood”
choke references pressure placed on the carotid arteries, located on either side
of the neck. The purpose of the blood choke is to interrupt the flow of
oxygenated blood to the brain.20

17

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565 (2020).
For a synthesis of the normative scholarship arguing criminal law minimalism as a
primary philosophy of crime governance, see generally Máximo Langer, Penal Abolitionism
and Criminal Law Minimalism: Here and There, Now and Then, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 42
(2020).
19 See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 3 (2017) (“A chokehold is
a maneuver in which a person’s neck is tightly gripped in a way that restrains breathing.”); E.
Karl Koiwai, Deaths Allegedly Caused by the Use of “Choke Holds” (Shime-Waza), 32 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 419, 428 (1987).
20 BUTLER, supra note 19, at 3 (“The truth is any human being will suffer distress when
pressure on the carotid arteries interrupts the supply of blood from the heart to the brain.”);
Koiwai, supra note 19, at 426–27.
18
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A person subject to the blood choke can lose consciousness in as little
as five to eleven seconds,21 and yet, some consider the blood choke to be a
less dangerous method of physical restraint as compared to physical blows
or the application of heavy pressure on the trachea (as in the case of the air
choke).22 There is also an emerging view that chokes are safer than punches
in light of studies that find more injuries in boxing as compared to sports such
as Brazilian jiu-jitsu, judo,23 and mixed martial arts,24 where the carotid
choke is applied as a submission technique.25 And while such studies might
be taken to support the relative safety of chokeholds in the context of sport,
it is important to remember that the carotid choke is rarely applied in
combat sport for a period sufficient to induce unconsciousness.26
When applied in the context of sport, the chokehold is typically
managed in a controlled setting by trained referees and participants who
21 Jamie R. Mitchell, Dan E. Roach, John V. Tyberg, Israel Belenkie & Robert S. Sheldon,
Mechanism of Loss of Consciousness During Vascular Neck Restraint, 112 J. APPLIED
PHYSIOLOGY 396, 396 (2012).
22 Id. at 401; see also Koiwai, supra note 19, at 431.
23 Judo is known more for spectacular throws, but participants may win a match by
applying shime-waza, or choking techniques that cause the opponent to give up or lose
consciousness. INT’L JUDO FED’N, REFEREEING RULES 2011-12 art. 20 (2011), https://web.
archive.org/web/20150924042953/http://www.intjudo.eu/editor_up/up/IJF%20REF%20RU
LES_Final%20print%20vers_2011-12_ENG_Final_amended.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS46RQ86].
24 Victory can be achieved by striking methods or choking methods, such as the chokes
utilized in Brazilian jiu-jitsu. Fighting Glossary, UFC, https://www.ufc.com/fighting-glossary
[https://perma.cc/EY8R-U7WD] (“MMA is the abbreviation for “mixed martial arts” and
refers to fighting with a combination of striking and grappling.”). In referencing use of the
chokehold in contemporary martial arts training and competition, we intend, in part, to convey
the “norm-ing” of the chokehold in pockets of American life in the same cultural moment in
which legislative bodies have come to recognize police application of the chokehold as an
underappreciated risk to the public.
25 Rate of injury per 1,000 athlete exposures is 250.6 in boxing, where punches are the
only legal technique, compared to 9.2 in Brazilian jiu-jitsu, where chokes are utilized by
punches and strikes are prohibited. For the boxing statistic, see T. R. Zazryn, C. F. Finch & P.
McCrory, A 16 Year Study of Injuries to Professional Boxers in the State of Victoria,
Australia, 37 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 321, 322 (2003). For Brazilian jiu-jitsu, see James F.
Scoggin III, Georgiy Brusovanik, Byron H. Izuka, Eddy Zandee van Rilland, Olga Geling &
Seren Tokumura, Assessment of Injuries During Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu Competition, 2
ORTHOPAEDIC J. SPORTS MED. 1, 1–2 (2014).
26 See, e.g., T.P. Grant, Palhares Breaks the Etiquette of the Tap, SB NATION (Aug. 3,
2015, 3:30 PM), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2015/8/3/9086187/wsof-22-rousimarpalhares-vs-jake-shields-opinion-editorial-tapping-etiquette-bjj-grappling-mma
[https://
perma.cc/4TD4-EZLB] (emphasizing the importance of “tapping out” or referee intervention
in sports grappling and mixed martial arts to end fights before an athlete is rendered
unconscious).
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consent in advance to this specific form of combat.27 To state the obvious,
the street-combat environment in which police apply the carotid choke is not
similarly controlled. Moreover, few if any studies have examined the quality
of officer training regarding application of the chokehold, the precision with
which the maneuver is applied during a volatile encounter in the field, and
its attendant rate of injury and death.28
Physiologically, the carotid and air chokes operate in very different
ways, but both act upon critical organs vulnerable to damage. Carotid chokes
take effect by compressing both the left and right internal carotid arteries,
which reduces blood flow to the brain29 (a particularly sensitive organ that
requires twenty percent of the body’s energy supply despite accounting for
only two percent of the human body mass).30
Air chokes trigger a different but overlapping physiology. The air choke
reduces breathing capacity by restricting the supply of oxygen to the lungs.
The suspension of oxygen flow to an organ is referenced in the medical field
as anoxia.31 An air choke rises to the level of anoxia if it blocks all oxygen
from reaching the lungs. As a function of blocking oxygen from the lungs,
the air choke may also sap the circulating blood of oxygen, which, in effect,
restricts the flow of oxygen to the brain, potentially damaging and killing
brain cells.32
Additionally, air chokes require more force as compared to carotid
chokes. The air choke is applied through pressure placed on the windpipe to
reduce or stop the flow of oxygen to the lungs. Significant pressure is placed
on the windpipe. This pressure carries a substantial risk of permanent damage
to the windpipe and its surrounding structures.33
27

Id.
See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CRIM. JUST., CHOKEHOLDS AND OTHER NECK RESTRAINTS 2
(2021),
https://counciloncj.foleon.com/policing/assessing-the-evidence/i-chokeholds-andother-neck-restraints/ [https://perma.cc/N7NQ-72L9] (“There is no reliable national data
describing how often police use chokeholds, airway restrictions, or carotid holds.”).
29 Mitchell, Roach, Tyberg, Belenkie & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 396–402; Koiwai,
supra note 19, at 431; TOM NOVACK, SUZANNE PENNA & ROBERT BRUNNER, U. ALA.
BIRMINGHAM TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJ. MODEL SYS. HYPOXIC/ANOXIC BRAIN INJURY 2 (2006).
30 Suzana Herculano-Houzel, Scaling of Brain Metabolism with a Fixed Energy Budget
Per Neuron: Implications for Neuronal Activity, Plasticity and Evolution, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 1
(2011).
31 Novack et. al, supra note 29.
32 Anoxic or Hypoxic Brain Injury, BANCROFT NEUROREHAB (June 19, 2021, 4:15 PM),
https://neurorehab.bancroft.org/conditions-treated/anoxic-or-hypoxic-brain-injury/ [https://
perma.cc/J8HF-2N8C].
33 Ask the Fight Doc: Is Brain Damage Possible When Chokes Are Held Too Long?,
MMAJUNKIE (July 12, 2011, 2:55 PM), https://mmajunkie.usatoday.com/2011/07/ask-the28
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Alternatively, the principal function of the carotid choke is to limit
(rather than stop) oxygen flow to the brain (a condition known as hypoxia) in
order to render the subject unconscious.34 The negative physical effects of
hypoxia are reversible if the condition lasts only a few seconds. This is true
even when the subject is rendered unconscious.35 However, prolonged
hypoxia and anoxia both carry a high risk of devastating and irreversible
brain injury and death.36
For these and other reasons, several state governments moved to restrict
police use of both air and carotid chokes in the months following George
Floyd’s death, with many states opting to prohibit the maneuver even in
circumstances in which the officer’s life is threatened. Municipal police
departments that addressed chokeholds also tended to restrict both chokes,
but opted against an absolute bar on the maneuver.37 Notably, the Trump
Administration’s Executive Order 13929 applied only to air chokes,
abstaining from carotid choke regulation.38
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE POLICE CHOKEHOLD
Federal regulation of the police chokehold is limited to Executive Order
13929, signed by President Trump on June 16, 2020. In the months following
George Floyd’s death, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate
advanced separate bills incentivizing state and local government regulation
of police chokeholds. Neither bill was enacted.
A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13929

President Trump waded into the debate on police use of chokeholds by
way of Executive Order 13929. The Order requires that state and local police
departments seeking federal funds certify that the use-of-force policies of
affiliated police departments bar the police use of chokeholds except in
fight-doc-is-brain-damage-possible-when-chokes-are-held-too-long [https://perma.cc/EU6NP8PZ].
34 Mitchell, Roach, Tyberg, Belenkie, & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 396–402.
35 Id.
36 Anoxic or Hypoxic Brain Injury, supra note 32.
37 Of the sixty enacted policies in our dataset, fourty-three of sixty specifically regulate
both air and blood chokes while only ten out of the sixty regulate air chokes exclusively.
38 Exec. Order No. 13,929, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,325 (June 16, 2020). Credentialing bodies
must certify that a law enforcement agency meets the (admittedly minimal) requirements of
the Executive Order for the agency to receive competitive federal grants. For a list of the
credentialing bodies, see List of Designated Independent Credentialing Bodies, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/executive_order/List_of_Credentialing_Bodies.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B3AP-UWZM].
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instances where deadly force is authorized.39 It expressly applies to air
chokes, describing the maneuver as an attempt to “restrict[] an individual’s
ability to breathe.”40 The Order does not address blood chokes. Additionally,
it assigns the Attorney General the responsibility of monitoring state and
local government compliance by establishing “independent credentialing
bodies.”41 To be credentialed by such bodies, law enforcement agencies must
comply with the Order’s standards for police chokehold regulation.42
B. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE POLICE
CHOKEHOLDS

To this point, Congress has not passed a federal law that deals explicitly
with the police chokehold. Representative Hakeem Jeffries (D-New York)
introduced the “Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act” in 2015.43 Jeffries’
bill would have made police application of the chokehold a “punishment,
pain, or penalty”44 under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which allows the federal
government to prosecute deprivations of civil rights under color of law.45 It
applied exclusively to police use of air chokes.46
In the month following the police killing of George Floyd, two other
bills addressing police chokeholds drew national attention: the “JUSTICE
Act,”47 sponsored by GOP Senator Tim Scott (S. 3985), and the “George
Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020,”48 broadly supported by House
Democrats (H.R. 7120).49 The two bills were similar in that each would have
incentivized chokehold regulation at the state and local levels by withholding
federal funding from law enforcement agencies that refused to take
regulatory action. The primary difference between the two bills is the degree
39

Exec. Order No. 13,929, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,325 (June 16, 2020).
Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act of 2015, H.R. 2052, 114th Cong. (2015).
44 The bill championed by House Democrats in 2020 contains very similar language. H.R.
Res. 7120, 116th Cong. § 363(c)(2) (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/
house-bill/2052/text [https://perma.cc/DW8R-UTNJ].
45 18 U.S.C. § 242.
46 Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act of 2015, H.R. 2052, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015)
47 JUSTICE Act, S. 3985, 116th Cong. (2020).
48 George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020).
49 Felicia Sonmez and Colby Itkowitz, House Passes Expansive Policing Overhaul Bill
Named in Honor of George Floyd, WASH. POST (March 3, 2021, 10:30 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/george-floyd-police-reform-bill-vote/2021/03/03/5ea9ba3a7c6c-11eb-85cd-9b7fa90c8873_story.html [https://perma.cc/UP52-WT5F].
40
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to which each restricts the maneuver. While S. 3985 prohibited the use of
chokeholds except when deadly force is authorized, H.R. 7120 contained no
such exception, requiring that state and local governments place an absolute
ban on police chokeholds to be eligible for federal criminal administration
funding.50 H.R. 7120 incorporated much of Rep. Jeffries’ 2015 bill but
expanded the definition of a chokehold to include both air chokes and carotid
chokes.51
Neither bill addressed police chokeholds exclusively. The Senate bill
criminalized sexual acts between federal law enforcement officers and those
in their custody and encouraged states to pass similar criminal provisions.52
The bill would also have given the federal government the authority to
prosecute lynching and, separately, interference with the exercise of federal
rights.53
The House bill encompassed a number of policies apart from police
chokehold regulation, including provisions imposing reporting requirements
on state and local police departments in terms of their use-of-force doctrine54
and data collection.55 It sought to establish a national task force on law
enforcement oversight56 and a “National Police Misconduct Registry,”57 and
prohibited racial profiling at the federal,58 state, and municipal levels.59 Like
the Senate bill, the House bill provided grants to police departments that
facilitated officer training in the duty to intervene,60 incentivized the use of

50 The relevant sections are S. 3985, 116th Cong. § 105(b)(1) (2020) and H.R. 7120, 116th
Cong. § 363(b) (2020).
51 See H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 363(c)(2) (2020).
52 S. 3985, 116th Cong. §§ 1001–03 (2020).
53 S. 3985, 116th Cong. §§ 401–03 (2020). Additional provisions in the Senate bill include
the imposition of reporting requirements on federal, state, and local police use of force, id.
§ 101, and execution of no-knock warrants, id. § 102; a mandate regarding the retention of
law enforcement records, id. § 301; funding for municipal law enforcement body-worn
cameras, id. §§ 201–02; grants to agencies for the training in alternatives to the use of force,
de-escalation, and the duty to intervene, id. §§ 601–02; and the creation of commissions and
studies tasked with obtaining expert advice and recommendations on issues affecting AfricanAmerican men and boys, id. §§ 501–08.
54 H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. §§ 221–27 (2020).
55 Id. § 118.
56 Id. § 117.
57 Id. §§ 201–02.
58 Id. §§ 301–21.
59 Id. §§ 331–35.
60 Id. § 361.
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body-worn cameras,61 sought regulation of no-knock warrants,62 and
criminalized sexual acts between federal law enforcement officers and those
in their custody.63
Neither bill was enacted into law in 2020. A motion to invoke cloture
on S. 3985 failed with only fifty-five Senate members in favor and forty-five
against.64 H.R. 7120 passed the House of Representatives (236 in favor, 181
against) on June 25, 2020;65 however, the Senate did not take up the bill, and
the Trump White House conveyed that if the bill passed, it would be vetoed.66
A renewed effort at Congressional regulation of the chokehold began in
the 117th Congress when the House passed H.R. 1280 on March 3, 2021, by
a vote of 220 to 212.67 H.R. 1280 is virtually identical to H.R. 7120.68 It
remains to be seen if H.R. 1280 will be enacted into law, though Democratic
Party control of the U.S. Senate and President Biden’s vocal support for
police chokehold reform via Congressional action suggest a better
opportunity at passage than in 2020.69
61

See id. §§ 371–82.
Id. § 362.
63 Id. §§ 401–05. Curiously, the final version of the House bill did not contain the antilynching provision originally introduced. The anti-lynching provisions were present in the
original bill introduced on June 6, 2020, in §§ 401–03 and in the amended version reported in
the House after scrutiny by the Judiciary Committee on June 19, 2020 (also in §§ 401–03).
The anti-lynching provisions were removed, however, in the amended version passed by the
House Rules Committee in House Bill 1017. H.R. 1017, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020).
64 Roll Call Vote 116th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (June 24, 2020), https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1162/vote_116_2_00126.htm [https://
perma.cc/LH46-FNUD]. Per Senate rules, the bill required sixty “Yes” votes in order to
invoke cloture and defeat a filibuster.
65 Roll Call 119 | Bill Number: H.R. 7120, U.S. HOUSE REP. CLERK (June 25, 2020),
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2020119 [https://perma.cc/3CU5-EDEQ].
66 House Passage of George Floyd Bill Puts Eyes on Senate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(June 27, 2020), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2020/06/27/House-passage-ofGeorge-Floyd-bill-puts-eyes-on-Senate/stories/202006270037 [https://perma.cc/57CC-YQ
RM].
67 George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021); Clare
Foran, House Passes Bill Named in Honor of George Floyd Aimed at Preventing Police
Misconduct, CNN (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/03/politics/house-votegeorge-floyd-policing-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/UF82-6QA9].
68 A side-by-side comparison of both bills shows only cosmetic differences, such as the
updating of the short title of House Bill 7120 from “George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of
2020” to “George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021” in House Bill 1280.
69 Although the U.S. Senate is as of this writing technically under Democratic control, the
chamber is evenly divided, with Vice President Harris breaking any 50-50 ties. It remains to
be seen if the Senate version of House Bill 1280 can garner sufficient bipartisan support to
overcome a Senate filibuster. President Biden indicated his support for the bill in a tweet
62
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III. STATE REGULATION OF THE POLICE CHOKEHOLD
As of this writing, a minority of states regulate the police chokehold by
way of statutory law. Table 1 summarizes the quality of state-level statutory
regulation with respect to four categories: the type of sanction, the degree of
the chokehold restriction, the type of chokehold banned, and whether an
officer observing an unlawful chokehold is legally obligated to intervene.
Table 1: State Statutes Regulating Chokeholds
State

Statute

Effective

Penalty70

Date of

Degree of

Type of

Duty to

Restriction71

Chokehold

Intervene73

72

Enactment

Indiana

IND. CODE

7/1/2021

banned

Administrative

§ 35-41-3-3

Deadly

Air

No

Force

(2022)
Massachusetts

S.B. 2963,

12/31/2020

Administrative

Total

Both

Yes

Criminal/

Total

Both

Yes

Total

Both

No

191st Gen.
Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass.
2020)
Vermont

S.B. 219,

10/1/2020

2020 Leg.,

Administrative

Reg. Sess.
(Vt. 2020)
California

CAL. GOV’T

9/30/2020

Administrative

CODE
§ 7286.5
(West 2022)

published on February 25th, 2021. Joseph Biden (@POTUS), TWITTER (Feb. 25, 2021, 11:04
AM), https://twitter.com/POTUS/status/1364984502133657602 [https://perma.cc/5SSK75KQ].
70 Indicates statutes that specifically criminalize the police chokehold.
71 ”Total” restrictions ban chokeholds in all circumstances. The term “Deadly Force” is
used where the statute creates an exception allowing the use of chokeholds in situations where
deadly force is authorized.
72 ”Both” refers to bans on air and blood chokes. “General” indicates that the legislation
does not clearly define the chokehold term. “Air” refers to restrictions placed on air chokes
exclusively.
73 Indicates whether a police chokehold policy requires police officers to intervene to stop
and/or report other officers who apply a chokehold in violation of chokehold policy.
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DEL. CODE

8/13/2020

ANN. tit. 11

Criminal/

Deadly

Administrative

Force

Administrative

Deadly

123
Both

No

Both

No

Both

Yes

Air

No

Both

No

Total

Both

No

Total

Both

Yes

Deadly

Both

Yes

Both

No

§ 607A
(West 2020)
Minnesota

H.F. 1, 2020

8/1/2020

Leg., Spec.

Force

Sess (Minn.
2020)
Connecticut

H.B. 6004,

7/31/2020

Administrative

2020 Leg.,

Deadly
Force

Spec. Sess.
(Conn. 2020)
Iowa

H.F. 2647,

7/1/2020

Administrative

88th Gen.

Deadly
Force

Assemb.,
Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 2020)
Oregon

H.B. 4203,

6/30/2020

Administrative

80th Leg.

Deadly
Force

Assemb.,
Spec Sess.
(Or. 2020)
Utah

H.B. 5007,

6/25/2020

2020 Leg.,

Criminal/
Administrative

5th Spec.
Sess. (Utah
2020)
Colorado

S.B. 20-217,

6/19/2020

2020 Leg.,

Criminal/
Administrative

Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2020)
New

H.B. 1645,

Hampshire

2020 Leg.,

6/16/2020

Administrative

Force

Gen. Sess.
(N.H. 2020)
New York

N.Y. PENAL
LAW
§ 121.13a

6/12/2020

Criminal/
Administrative

Total
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(McKinney
2022)
Illinois

720 ILL.

1/1/2016

Administrative

COMP. STAT.

Deadly

Air

No

Force

ANN. 5/7-5.5
(West 2020)
Nevada

A.B. 3, 2020

8/7/2020

Administrative

Total

Both

Yes

7/1/1993

Administrative

Intermediate*

General

No

Criminal/

Total (Air) /

Both

No

Administrative

Deadly

Leg., 32nd
Sess. (Nev.
2020)
Tennessee

TENN.CODE
ANN. § 38-8113

Washington,

D.C. CODE

D.C.

§ 5-125.03

1/25/1986

(2022)

Force
(Blood)

*

The Tennessee statute requires that officers utilize a chokehold only when other “less dangerous restraint

methods” have been exhausted.

A. QUALITY OF SANCTION

Most state governments do not regulate the police chokehold, though
sixteen states and the District of Columbia restrict police application of the
chokehold by way of statutory law. Five of the regulating states criminalized
a police chokehold policy violation. A number of states have made officerdefendants charged with illegal application of the police chokehold ineligible
for criminal law justification defenses.74
Washington D.C. passed a statute regulating police chokeholds in
1986.75 The D.C. regulation requires that District police officers charged with
illegal use of the chokehold while on duty be subject to dismissal as well as

74 See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 603
(4th ed. 2015) (“A justification defense is one in which the defendant claims he did the right
thing or took the most appropriate actions under the circumstances.”). Defendants can
generally offer justification defenses such as self-defense, which advance the claim that the
defendant acted correctly under the circumstances despite having violated the criminal law.
Many if not most justification defenses serve as a complete defense to the underlying criminal
charge, nullifying criminal liability if credited. Id.; see, e.g., H.B. 4203, 80th Legis. Assemb.,
Spec. Sess. (Or. 2020).
75 D.C., CODE § 5-125.01–.03 (1986).
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a fine of up to $5000, imprisonment for up to one year, or both.76 Apart from
this early outlier (momentarily categorizing D.C. as a quasi-state), no state
introduced criminal sanctions for the police chokehold until the killing of
George Floyd. On June 12, 2020, New York state enacted a statute
establishing the offense of “aggravated strangulation.”77 The prohibition
applies to any chokehold resulting in serious injury or death, and a violation
represents a Class C felony punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment.78
Colorado,79 Utah,80 Delaware,81 and Vermont82 have since followed New
York’s lead, adding “aggravated strangulation” or a similarly characterized
offense to their respective state criminal codes.
Several other states have limited the sanction for a chokehold violation
to administrative sanction. Oregon’s HB 4203 exemplifies this genre of
sanction.83 HB 4203 prohibits chokehold training for police and clarifies that
the justification defense is inapplicable for a defendant charged with
unlawful use of the chokehold unless the underlying event was such that the
officer was legally authorized to use deadly force.84 The statute does not
create a new criminal offense, leaving the implication that the statutory
framework for criminal assault would suffice for prosecutorial purposes.
B. DEGREE OF RESTRICTION

Nearly all state statutory chokehold regulations impose either a total ban
on the use of chokeholds or limit their use to circumstances in which deadly
force is authorized.
C. A DUTY TO INTERVENE

Only two state statutes require officers to physically intervene upon
observing a fellow officer apply an unauthorized chokehold. Vermont
requires that a police officer, having made such an observation, stop the

76

D.C., CODE § 5-125.03(c) (1986).
Eric Garner Anti-Chokehold Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 121.13 (McKinney 2021). New
York State passed the Anti-Chokehold Act eight years after Eric Garner’s strangulation by
New York Police Department officers on Staten Island.
78 Id.
79 Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act, 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 445.
80 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-13-115 (West 2020).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 607A (2021).
82 2020 Vt. Acts & Resolves 639 (Act No. 147).
83 2020 Or. Laws Spec. Sess. 2508 (HB 4203).
84 Id.; see also 2020 Iowa Acts 68 (H.F. 2647); 2020 Minn. Laws 1261 (H.F. 1).
77
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violating officer and report the infraction.85 Failure to intervene amounts to
“gross professional misconduct” enabling the Vermont Criminal Justice
Training Council to impose sanctions on the officer in question, up to and
including termination.86 Colorado recently took the step of making an
officer’s failure to intervene to prevent excessive force a Class 1
misdemeanor, expressly characterizing the banned chokeholds as excessive
force that triggers the corresponding intervention obligation.87
IV. MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF THE POLICE CHOKEHOLD
Our policy data indicate that the chokehold policies enacted among the
nation’s largest municipalities generally do not impose criminal sanctions.88
Instead, large municipalities tend to restrict police use of the chokehold
through police department procedural manuals (or their equivalent). Such
manuals generally articulate the degree of the chokehold restriction and the
associated administrative penalty. The administrative penalty is itself
addressed in a separate section pertaining to any number of procedural
violations. Of the fifty largest municipalities in the country (by population),
forty-three regulate police chokeholds through administrative regulations
established by the police department.89
A. QUALITY OF SANCTION

Municipal police department manuals typically list authorized
applications of force—the matrix of force options available to police
officers.90 The San Antonio Police Department General Manual dictates that
85

S. 219, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 5 (Vt. 2020).
Id.
87 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 445, § 6(d) (codified at COL. REV. STAT. § 18-8-802(1.5)(d)
(2021)).
88 The lone exception in the dataset is N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-181 (2020), which
bans all chokeholds “in the course of effecting or attempting an arrest,” punishable by a fine
of up to $2,500, up to one year’s imprisonment, or both.
89 Those forty-three municipalities are: New York City; Chicago; Houston; Phoenix; Las
Vegas; Philadelphia; San Antonio; San Diego; Dallas; Suffolk County, NY; Fairfax County,
VA; San Jose, CA; Montgomery County, MD; Honolulu; Austin; Charlotte, NC; Jacksonville,
FL; Fort Worth, TX; Columbus, OH; San Francisco; Indianapolis; Baltimore County, MD;
Seattle; Denver; Washington, D.C.; Prince George’s County, MD; Boston; Nashville;
Louisville; Detroit; Portland; Oklahoma City; Memphis; Baltimore; Cobb County, GA;
Albuquerque; Tucson; Anne Arundel County, MD; Fresno, CA; Sacramento; Mesa, AZ;
Kansas City, MO; Raleigh, NC.
90 SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEP’T, GEN. MANUAL: PROCEDURE 501 – USE OF FORCE 2 (2017),
https://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/SAPD/GeneralManual/501.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JCZ7-HMFF].
86
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police must respond to a cooperative suspect with verbal communications,
but may use an intermediate weapon such as an “Electronic Control Device”
if a suspect engages in active resistance.91 In discussing force options, many
manuals specify whether chokeholds are permitted and under what
circumstances. In its overview of force options, the Chicago Police
Department limits police application of the chokehold to circumstances in
which deadly force is authorized.92 As mentioned above, most police
manuals do not directly address the sanction for violating chokehold policies,
but hold that any member violating departmental policy may be subject to
disciplinary action, the most severe action being employment termination.
Several municipalities regulate the police chokehold by way of city
ordinance.93 New York City bans use of the chokehold “in the course of
effecting or attempting an arrest.”94 An officer in violation of the ordinance
faces up to a year in jail and a fine of up to $2,500, or both.95 Seattle’s
ordinance, enacted in 2020, prohibits all police chokeholds and creates a right
of action for victims of police chokeholds to sue the city.96 The civil suit
provision sets minimum damages for victims at $100,000 and requires city
coverage of attorney and court fees.97
B. DEGREE OF RESTRICTION

Of the fifty largest municipalities, only two do not appear to regulate
police chokeholds specifically.98 Most have established strict restrictions. A
substantial majority of the municipal chokehold policies (thirty-seven out of
forty-eight) prohibit both air and carotid chokes.99 Twenty ban police use of
the chokehold without exception, while nearly all of the others permit police
use of the chokehold in circumstances in which an officer would be
91

Id. at 4.
CHI. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER G03-02-01: FORCE OPTIONS 6 (2017)
(“Chokeholds are only justified as a use of deadly force.”)
93 A search using a comprehensive municipal code research database did not reveal
additional municipal-tier police chokehold ordinances among the fifty largest municipalities.
Search, MUNICODE, library.municode.com/search [https://perma.cc/83YY-MMMH].
94 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-181 (2020).
95 Id.
96 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 126096 (June 26, 2020).
97 Id.
98 For instance, MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE: SEC. 460
- USE OF FORCE (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/
569abf43c21b86e3d56a32fe/1452982086699/Milwaukee+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/N9VT-YAYD] did not contain references to chokeholds or neck restraints.
99 Project Dataset.
92
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authorized to use deadly force. None of the municipal policies in the dataset
authorized police chokeholds in response to a nondeadly threat.
C. A DUTY TO INTERVENE

Nearly two-thirds of the dataset’s municipal chokehold policies
contained a provision that required police officers to intervene if they
observed a fellow officer engaging in excessive force, which would include
circumstances in which an officer violated chokehold policy.
D. THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF MUNICIPAL RESTRICTIONS

Table 2: Chokehold Regulation Across Federal, State, and Local
Government
States100

Municipalities101

Federal

Police Chokehold Regulation

33% (17/51)

96% (48/50)

(1/1)

Legislative Action102

100% (17/17)

8.3% (4/48)

(0/1)

Administrative Action

12% (2/17)

100% (48/48)

(1/1)

Total Ban

47% (8/17)

41.6% (20/48)

(0/1)

58% (28/48)

(1/1)

Deadly Force Exception
Criminal

Sanction104

47%

(8/17)103

35% (6/17)

2% (1/48)

(0/1)

Administrative Sanction

88% (15/17)

100% (39/44)

(1/1)

Criminal and Administrative
Sanction

29 % (5/17)

0% (0/48)

(0/1)

Regulation of Both Air and
Carotid Chokes

76% (13/17)

77% (37/48)

(0/1)

Duty to Intervene

35% (6/17)

66% (29/44)

(0/1)

100

Includes Washington, D.C.
Here, we assess the fifty largest municipalities in the country (by population size served
by a single police department) set aside from the well over 18,000 municipalities at the local
level, encompassing 12,000 police agencies and 18,000 agencies that employ police officers.
YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, ORIN S. KERR, & EVE
BRENSIKE PRIMUS, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 4
(14th ed. 2015). Municipalities that did not have publicly available use of force documents at
the time of the dataset’s population were counted as non-regulated jurisdictions.
102 Percentage of police chokehold policies enacted by way of the legislature.
103 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 289.810 (2011). A Nevada police chokehold statute was
excluded from the “total ban” and “deadly force exception” categories as it only went so far
as to require that Nevada policing agencies create police chokehold regulations. Id.
104 Police chokeholds that criminalize violations of the underlying policy.
101
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A comparison of state and municipal regulations of police chokeholds
shows a mixed bag. Table 2 compares the quantity and strength of police
chokehold regulations at each level of government, adding as a backdrop
policy details from the executive order established by the Trump
administration in July of 2020.
Just sixteen states and Washington, D.C. regulate the police chokehold
(33%), while a substantial majority of the most populous municipalities in
the nation (96%) have chosen to limit or prohibit application of the
maneuver.105 Moreover, of the large municipalities that regulate police
chokeholds, 66% have established an officer’s duty to intervene as compared
to 35% of the regulating states.106 But of the states that expressly regulate
police chokeholds, the rate at which they attach a criminal sanction is
significantly higher than that of large municipalities (35% to 2%).107 Finally,
it seems that the states and municipalities that regulate police chokeholds
apply restrictions exceeding those requested by the federal government.108
Nearly all the state and municipal policies populating the dataset meet or
exceed the minimum standard required of subnational governments within
the regulatory framework of Executive Order 13929.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the nation processed the events surrounding Mr. Floyd’s death, a
sizable number of states and municipalities chose to regulate police
chokeholds. We laud these regulations and find them to be in keeping with
the ethos of the Black Lives Matter movement and responsive to the broader
national reckoning regarding police accountability. In this Part, we shift from
a profile of government regulation of the police chokehold to offer a series
of basic recommendations regarding chokehold policy.
1. The Reach of Police Chokehold Policy: Every police officer should
be subject to chokehold regulation. To this end, the thirty-seven states that
have yet to establish policies regulating police use of the chokehold should
do so in short order. Municipalities should also consider establishing police
chokehold restrictions, either to compensate for the absence of a state-level
regulatory framework or to strengthen state-level restrictions in keeping with
the regulatory parameters outlined below.

105

Project Dataset.
Id.
107 Id.
108 For a detailed overview of Executive Order 13929, see Exec. Order No. 13929, 85 Fed.
Reg. 37325, Part I (Jun. 16, 2020).
106
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2. An Absolute Bar on Air and Carotid Chokes: Several states and
municipalities have recently moved to ban the police chokehold without
qualification (Table 2).109 We find this policy movement heartening given
recent video evidence of the brutality of the chokehold and its reckless
application by police. At a minimum, state and local governments should bar
police use of chokeholds for the purpose of apprehending a fleeing suspect
or a “dangerous person” thought to pose a hypothetical and future (rather
than immediate) threat to the public.110
There remains the question of whether legislatures should bar police
chokeholds without exception. Our tentative response is, yes. Police
chokeholds are manifestly dangerous, prone to abuse, and hold the subtext of
national pathologies at the intersection of race, punishment, and
asphyxiation.111 We call on governments to consider each of these factors,
but also the relative risk associated with various force options including air
and carotid chokes, police taser use, and police firearm use.
We acknowledge that while tasing may seem a welcome alternative to
the chokehold in terms of a submission technique short of firing a gun, there

109

See supra Table 2 and text accompanying notes 100–04.
It is worth mentioning again that both the air choke and the carotid choke are potentially
lethal maneuvers. The touchstone of what constitutes deadly force should be the type of force
that holds a significant risk of loss of life. Though a carotid choke might be relatively effective
at causing unconsciousness without also restricting air flow or posing a high probability of
death, the potential for death by way of carotid choke is significant. Mitchell, Roach, Tyberg,
Belenkie & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 396–402. Moreover, the risk of death is sometimes
compounded by the involuntary injection of drugs to subdue an unruly suspect for purposes
of arrest. Osagie K. Obasogie & Anna Zaret, Medical Professionals, Excessive Force, and the
Fourth Amendment, 109 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25–27, 55 (2021) (describing an incident in which a
suspect was taken to the ground by police, “put into a chokehold, and handcuffed face-down
with his hands behind his back. While handcuffed and immobilized, Aurora Fire Rescue
arrived at the scene and injected McClain with five hundred milligrams of ketamine. McClain
went into cardiac arrest in the ambulance on the way to the hospital. He was pronounced brain
dead several days later and taken off of life support.”).
111 See AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA, 1890-1940 29–30 (Charles Reagan Wilson, 2009) (presenting a history of
“hanging-day” rituals at which African-Americans were often executed before large crowds:
110

In 1879, the Chicago Tribune bemoaned hanging days in the South, which ‘seem to be devised
for the entertainment of the people and to take the place of the circus and the dog-fight,’ a
phenomenon that was only made more ‘atrocious’ by the fact that ‘the gallows is intended only
for the negro.’ When it came to black criminals, the paper opined, ‘the usual mode is to hang him
and lynch him without the benefit of the law,’ and even when he did stand trial, ‘the demand for
justice is tremendous—if the prisoner is a negro—and he is hurried out of the world neck and
heels.’

See also, comments by Daryl Gates, Rasberry, supra note 12.
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is evidence indicating that tasing poses a significant risk of death. 112
Moreover, in some instances an officer grappling with a suspect and
authorized to use deadly force will not be able to use his or her taser
effectively. It is at least conceivable that the officer might at that point elect
to use his or her firearm given the chokehold ban. This is merely to suggest
that in the absence of a deadly force exception to the police chokehold, police
officers authorized to use deadly force may be incentivized to use force
options more lethal than the chokehold. In this sense, the utility of the
chokehold is not immediately clear to us given our uncertainty as to the
relative risk of the various deadly force options, particularly as they map onto
various categories of physical engagement.113 However, in the event that the
chokehold cannot be definitively established as safer than alternative forms
of deadly force, it should be barred in all circumstances.
3. Adherence to the Principle of Criminal-Law Minimalism: Police
chokeholds should be regulated closely. The chokehold policy blitz in the
wake of George Floyd’s death suggests that this sentiment is taking hold
among legislatures and police departments across the nation. But the instinct
to attach a criminal penalty for unlawful police application of the chokehold
should be resisted given that, as a general matter, state and municipal
legislatures should be oriented toward narrowing rather than expanding the
scope of the criminal code.
In prosecuting police chokeholds, the state should be left to rely on the
part of the criminal code that addresses aggravated criminal assault.
Prosecutors do not need a new criminal assault category that punishes
chokeholds outside of the standard criminal legal framework governing

112

For a review of the risks associated with police taser use, see Cheryl W. Thompson &
Mark Berman, Improper Techniques, Increased Risks: Deaths Have Raised Questions About
the Risk of Excessive or Improper Deployment of Tasers, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/11/26/improper-techniquesincreased-risks/ [https://perma.cc/796K-4YXV].
113 Perhaps there is a case to be made that an officer grappling with a suspect and
authorized to use deadly force cannot use his or her taser effectively. It would seem that, as a
general matter, the risks associated with taser use should be considered in relation to the risks
associated with air and carotid chokes. Matthew J. Hickman, Robert M. Scales, Jared N. Strote
& John L. Worrall, Use of Vascular Neck Restraints in Law Enforcement: A Case-Study of
Spokane, WA, 22 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 1, 14 (forthcoming Jun. 2021) (arguing based on a
quantitative study of police chokeholds in Spokane, Washington, that “[b]anning [vascular
neck restraints] will not reduce the need to use force, so officers will just use some other tactic
or weapon. Taking away less-lethal options from officers may increase the likelihood they
will end up using their firearms.”).
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assaults.114 While the criminalization of the police chokehold is the sort of
criminal lawmaking that may have a strong expressive function,115 it would
exemplify the pathology that drives contemporary penal dysfunction given
that it is superfluous to state criminal codes.116 Legislators can affirm the
principle of criminal-law minimalism while also (i) barring police
departments from authorizing police chokeholds, (ii) mandating an
administrative sanction for police use of the chokehold, and (iii) allowing for
criminal prosecution of police use of the chokehold in cases such as that of
Officer Chauvin in relation to the killing of George Floyd.
Every jurisdiction in the U.S. is governed by criminal laws that prohibit
and punish assault, battery, and aggravated versions of these offenses. Thus,
as a general matter, conventional criminal law is sufficient to hold rogue
officers accountable. The remaining question is the disposition of prosecutors
and juries. Will prosecutors hold police accountable to the criminal laws
already on the books? Will juries hold police accountable for criminal
violence when the evidence dictates conviction, or opt instead for verdicts
that vaguely signal jury nullification?
CONCLUSION
Police encounters with the public far too often lead to unnecessary
escalation, bloodshed, and death. The data analysis presented in this Article
suggests that a growing portion of the public and its elected representatives
share this sentiment. The nation is trending toward broad regulation of police
chokeholds by way of related policies at the federal, state, and municipal
levels of government. Police reform advocates must continue to pressure
governments to regulate both air and carotid chokes such that police
administrators no longer hold the authority to validate police application of
the chokehold under use-of-force policy. When police apply the chokehold
114

But see Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
997, 1035 (2021) (arguing that the call for police prosecutions risks repetition of the
pathologies of the penal system: “[T]he individual prosecutions of officers in the past few
years suggest one major risk of increased police prosecutions is the increased prosecution of
officers of color. The recent trials of three officers of color suggest, at least, that the racial
pathologies of the criminal legal system replay themselves in the tropes and language
employed against them.”).
115 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV 2021,
2024 (1996) (“[T]he function of law [is] in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling
behavior directly.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 1044 (1995) (“The social world is constituted by social meanings; these social meanings
impose costs on, and supply benefits to, individuals and groups; individuals and groups use
them to advance individual or collective ends; and their range makes them essential tools in
any individual’s or collective’s life.”).
116 See Kindy, Schaul & Mellnik, supra note 16.
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in violation of administrative policy, they should be subject to harsh
administration sanction along with close prosecutorial scrutiny.

